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1Environmental Policy and the Collapse of the Monocentric City
Abstract
We explain the spatial concentration of economic activity, in a model of economic
geography, when the cost of environmental policy - which is increasing in the concentra-
tion of pollution - acts as a centrifugal force, while positive knowledge spillovers and a
site with natural cost advantage act as centripetal forces. We study the agglomeration
e￿ects caused by trade-o￿s between centripetal and centrifugal forces which eventually
determine the distribution of economic activity across space. The rational expectations
market equilibrium with spatially myopic environmental policy results either in a mono-
centric or in a polycentric city with the major cluster at the natural advantage site. The
regulator’s optimum results in a bicentric city which suggests that when environmen-
tal policy is spatially optimal, the natural advantage sites do not act as attractors of
economic activity.
JEL classi￿cation: R38, Q58.
Keywords: Agglomeration, Space, Environmental policy, Natural cost advantage,
Knowledge spillovers, Monocentric-bicentric city.
21 Introduction
Among the major factors explaining the emergence of industrial agglomerations are in-
dustry spillovers and the existence of locations with natural cost advantage. The ￿rst
factor is one of the classic Marshallian sources of external economics and refers to the
concentration of economic activity at a speci￿c interval that is created through informa-
tion or knowledge spillovers. However, Marshall (1920) also identi￿ed the second factor
of natural advantage as a determinant of industry location. In particular, he (Marshall,
1920, p. 269) argued that the location decisions of industries are highly in￿uenced by
physical conditions, such as the climate, the soil, mines or quarries in nearby areas, or
easy access by land or water.
Krugman (1999) identi￿es not only the importance of ￿rst nature advantage and
Marshallian externalities in explaining agglomeration, but also the interaction between
them. Thus, natural geography determines the city site in most cases. A lot of cities
are created around a port so as to have easy access to the goods transported, or a lot of
industries using mineral resources in the production process are located near the mines,
so as to avoid the high transportation cost. One can think of many examples of this
kind and the result is easily predicted: sites with \natural advantages" are more likely
to attract a large number of agents and economic activity. But once the site has been
chosen and the city is established, there are other forces that persist and lead to an
even higher concentration of economic activity around the ￿rst nature advantage point.
These are the interactions between economic agents, such as knowledge and information
spillovers, economies of intra-industry specialization, or labor market economies. As
Krugman (1999) points out, that kind of forces has been proved to be stronger, after
natural geography has determined the agglomeration point.
The ￿rst nature advantage and the interactions between economic agents have also
been studied empirically, as they provide two of the most signi￿cant forces explaining
the clustering of economic activity. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) show that one-￿fth of
this clustering can be attributed to observable natural advantages such as resource and
labor-market natural advantages. LaFountain (2005), studying the reasons that lead
3di￿erent industries to locate in di￿erent places, ￿nds strong evidence supporting the
location of speci￿c ￿rms around natural advantage sites. Roos (2005) shows that more
than one-third of agglomeration in Germany can be attributed to natural features and
agglomeration economies. Rosenthal and Strange (2001, 2004) ￿nd empirical evidence
regarding the signi￿cance of natural advantages and knowledge spillovers as determinants
of agglomeration.
The theoretical and empirical literature analyzed above implies that ￿rst nature ad-
vantage sites will attract a high number of industries. When certain industries decide
to locate around that site, then the need for other industries to locate nearby so as to
bene￿t from information and knowledge spillovers is even stronger. As a consequence,
there is always a higher concentration of economic activity around ￿rst nature advantages
sites. The use of the examples of New York or Mexico City in describing the in￿uence of
those two forces is common in the literature of New Economic Geography. However, high
industrial concentration is sometimes associated with certain negative externalities, such
as pollution or congestion, which implies that there may be a better equilibrium than the
one obtained by market equilibrium. In that case, as Krugman (1999, p. 159) argues,
government intervention and enforcement of the suitable policy are required, and this
may lead to a situation di￿erent from the one corresponding to unregulated equilibrium.
In this paper we study the geographical concentration of industrial activity by com-
bining the agglomeration forces of knowledge spillovers and the existence of a location
with natural cost advantage, with the fact that the industrial activity is associated with
emissions of pollutants. Emissions cause damages and this creates the need to regulate
them by implementing environmental policy. In our model, environmental policy takes
the form of emission taxes which are di￿erent among locations and tend to be higher in
sites where the concentration of pollutants is relatively higher. Furthermore, the concen-
tration of pollutants in a given site is determined not only by emissions generated in that
site, but also by emissions generated in nearby locations, since in our model emissions
di￿use in space.
Thus, while knowledge spillovers and natural cost advantage act as centripetal forces
4which promote agglomeration and clustering of industrial activity, environmental policy
acts as a centrifugal force, since agglomeration tends to increase the concentration of pol-
lutants and consequently emission taxes, which represents a higher cost to the industry.1
Our intention is to examine how the assumption of pollution which implies the enforce-
ment of environmental policy will a￿ect the high concentration of economic activity that
results from knowledge spillovers and natural advantage. The question we try to answer
is whether environmental policy can refute the prediction (e.g. Krugman, 1999) that
agglomeration of economic activity will emerge around a ￿rst nature advantage site as a
result of the interaction between knowledge spillovers and natural cost advantage forces.2
To the best of our knowledge, the assumption of pollution di￿using in space and the im-
plementation of environmental policy have never been combined with the two important
determinants of agglomeration studied here, i.e. spatial inhomogeneity in the form of an
inherent advantage and production externalities.
In our model the spatial distribution of industrial activity, in a given ￿nite spatial
domain, is determined under two di￿erent assumptions regarding the implementation
of environmental policy: a \spatially myopic" policy and a \spatially optimal" policy.
When policy is myopic, the emission tax in a given location does not take into account
the impact that emissions in this same location have on aggregate pollution and asso-
ciated environmental damages in nearby locations due to spatial di￿usion of emissions.
Myopic policy is associated with the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
where pro￿t maximizing ￿rms in each location treat knowledge spillovers and the con-
centration of pollution as ￿xed parameters. A spatially optimal or simply optimal policy
is determined in the context of the regulator’s optimum. In this case, emission taxes
in a given location account for the impact of local emissions on pollution concentration
and environmental damages in neighboring locations. We model knowledge spillovers and
1The argument that environmental regulations impede the agglomeration of economic activity has
been established by the empirical literature. Henderson (1996) shows that air quality regulation leads
pollution industries to spread out, moving from polluted to cleaner areas. Greenstone (2002) ￿nds that
environmental regulation restricts industrial activity.
2Environmental issues have not been studied a lot in new economic geography models. Some excep-
tions are the recent works of Lange and Quaas (2007) and van Marrewijk (2005) who study the e￿ect
of pollution on agglomeration assuming local pollution. Arnott et al. (2008) assume non-local pollution
while investigating the role of space in the control of pollution externalities.
5spatial di￿usion of emissions by symmetric exponentially declining integral kernels, while
natural cost advantage is modeled by iceberg type input costs which increase with the
distance from the natural advantage location.
Our results, based on numerical simulations, indicate that when the centripetal forces
of knowledge spillovers and natural cost advantage for a location are combined with the
centrifugal force of spatially di￿erentiated environmental policy, then in the REE the main
cluster of economic activity is always observed around the natural advantage location as
suggested by the literature.3 However, when environmental policy is optimal, there is no
agglomeration on the location with the natural advantage but instead industrial activity is
concentrated in two clusters forming a bicentric city. As our numerical simulations show,
the result of a repelling natural cost advantage location is quite robust in parameter
changes, as well as in the placement of the natural cost advantage location in di￿erent
sites of our spatial domain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
and its mathematical structure, Section 3 determines the regulator’s optimum, while in
Section 4, we derive optimal spatial policies. In Section 5, we present our numerical
experiments and compare the di￿erent output distributions corresponding to the REE
and the optimal solutions. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium under Centripetal
and Centrifugal Forces
We consider a ￿nite spatial domain, which could be interpreted as a single city or a region
located on a line of length S. Thus 0 and S can be thought of as the western and eastern
borders of the city, which is part of a large economy. In the city, there is a large number of
small, identical ￿rms that produce a single good. There are also workers who live at their
workplaces and take no location decisions. The production process is characterized by
3Although we prove existence and uniqueness of the REE and the regulator’s optimum, speci￿c
results are obtained by simulations due to the well-known intractability of economic geography models
that prevents closed form solutions.
6externalities in the form of positive knowledge spillovers.4 This means that ￿rms bene￿t
from locating near each other and the total advantage they have depends on the amount
of labor used in nearby areas and on the distance between them.
We assume that there is an inherent cost advantage in a speci￿c site ￿ r 2 [0;S] which
can take various interpretations. For example, ￿ r could be a port, a natural resource
extraction site, or an area where cheap energy can be found. In this case, ￿rms that use
inputs which can be obtained more cheaply if they locate near the cost advantage site,
would compete to locate near this site. Thus location ￿ r has a natural cost advantage. In
this paper we assume, without loss of generality, that at point ￿ r there is a port, which
is used to import machinery. Machinery arrives at the port at an exogenous price that
includes cost, insurance and freight (cif price). The transportation of machinery inside
the city is costly. Thus if ￿rms decide to locate close to the port, they will pay very small
transportation costs for the machinery. At all other points, the transportation cost will
add an additional cost to the production process. Finally, we treat emissions as an input
in the production process.5
We study the equilibrium spatial distribution of production in order to determine the
distribution of economic activity over sites r 2 [0;S].6 All ￿rms produce the same traded
good using labor, machinery, emissions and land. The good is sold around the world at
a competitive price assuming no transportation cost.7 Production per unit of land at
4There are a lot of empirical studies that con￿rm the role of knowledge spillovers in the location
decisions of ￿rms. Keller (2002) ￿nds that technological knowledge spillovers are signi￿cantly local and
their bene￿ts decline with distance. Bottazzi and Peri (2003) prove that knowledge spillovers resulting
from patent applications are very localised and positively a￿ect regions within a distance of 300 km.
Carlino et al. (2007) provide evidence on patent intensity for metropolitan areas in the US and conclude
that it is a￿ected by employment density.
5The concept of emissions / pollution as an input in the production function was ￿rst introduced
by Brock (1977) and later used by other authors, eg. Jouvet et al. (2005), Rauscher (1994), Stokey
(1998), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), Xepapadeas (2005). The idea behind this assumption is
that techniques of production are less costly in terms of capital input (machinery in our case) if more
emissions are allowed - a situation which is observed in the real world. In other words, if we use polluting
techniques, we can reduce the total cost of production.
6Land is owned by landlords who play no role in our analysis.
7This assumption is used by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). Alternatively, we could assume
that the good is exported from the port to the larger economy at a ￿xed (competitive) price, but
the transportation to the port is costly. In that case, the transportation cost of the output would
push economic activity to concentrate around the port and would have the same implications as the
transportation cost of the machinery input.






where q is the output, L is the labor input, K is the machinery input, E is the amount of
emissions used in production and z is the production externality, which depends on how







The function k(r;s) = e￿￿(r￿s)2 is called a kernel. The production externality is a
positive function of labor employed in all areas and is assumed to decay exponentially at
a rate ￿ with the distance between r and s: A high ￿ indicates that only labor in nearby
areas a￿ects production positively. In other words, the higher ￿ is, the more pro￿table it
is for ￿rms to locate near each other. When the production externality is strong, each ￿rm
chooses to locate where all other ￿rms are located. In terms of agglomeration economics,
the production externality is a centripetal force, i.e. a force that promotes the spatial
concentration of economic activity.
As already stated, point ￿ r has a natural cost advantage over other possible locations.
If the price of machinery at ￿ r is pK; then iceberg transportation costs imply that the
price at location r can be written as pK(r) = pK e￿(r￿￿ r)2: In other words, if one unit
of machinery is transported from ￿ r to r, only a fraction e￿￿(r￿￿ r)2 reaches r:9 So ￿ is the
transportation cost per square unit of distance, which is assumed to be positive and ￿nite.
It is obvious that the total transportation cost of machinery increases with distance.10
8This kind of external e￿ects is used by Lucas (2001) and by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) - with
a di￿erent structure - and is consistent with Fujita and Thisse’s (2002) analysis. The idea is that workers
at a spatial point bene￿t from labor in nearby areas and thus, the distance between ￿rms determines
the production of ideas and the productivity of ￿rms in a given region.
9For a detailed analysis of \iceberg costs", see Fujita et al. (1999) and Fujita and Thisse (2002).
Conceptually, with the \iceberg" forms, we assume that a fraction of the good transported melts away
or evaporates in transit.
10We can use another formulation of iceberg transportation cost, pK(r) = pK e￿jr￿￿ rj instead of pK(r) =
pK e￿(r￿￿ r)
2
; without changing the conclusions of the analysis.
8Thus ￿rms have an incentive to locate near point ￿ r to avoid a higher transportation cost.
Like knowledge spillovers, the transportation cost is a centripetal force.
The emissions used in the production process damage the environment. The damage




where ￿ ￿ 1; D0(X) > 0; D00(X) ￿ 0; and the marginal damage function is:
MD(r) = ￿ X(r)
￿￿1 (4)
Each ￿rm has to pay a \price" or a tax for each unit of emissions it generates. This
tax ￿ is a function of the marginal damage (MD):
￿(r) = ￿ MD(r) (5)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, and ￿ = 1 means that the full marginal damage at point r is charged as
a tax. In other words, each ￿rm pays an amount of money for the emissions used in the
production of the output, but the per unit tax depends not only on its own emissions,
but also on the concentration of pollution at the spatial point where it decides to locate.
The tax function can be written as:
￿(r) = ￿ ￿ X(r)
￿￿1 =   X(r)
￿￿1 (6)
where   = ￿ ￿; ￿0(X) > 0; ￿00(X) ￿ 0:
When solving our model, we use the logarithm of the tax function, thus:








9Equation (8) implies that aggregate pollution (X) at a point r is a weighted average
of the emissions generated in nearby locations, with kernel k(r;s) = e￿￿(r￿s)2. This aims
at capturing the movement of emissions in nearby places. A high ￿ indicates that only
nearby emissions a￿ect the concentration of pollution at point r: In the real world, the
value of ￿ depends on weather conditions and on natural landscape. As we have assumed
that the only dissimilarity in our land is the existence of a port, we assume that ￿ is
in￿uenced only by weather conditions. Speci￿cally, if wind currents are strong, ￿ takes
a low value and areas at a long distance from r are polluted by emissions generated at
r. As ￿ increases, the concentration of emissions in certain areas does not pollute other
areas so much.
Thus the cost of environmental policy, ￿(X(r)); increases the total production cost
for the ￿rms. The extra amount of money that a ￿rm pays in the form of taxation
depends on the concentration of pollution at the point where it has decided to locate.
To put it di￿erently, the higher the concentration of production in an interval [s1;s2] ￿
[0;S]; the higher the environmental related costs that ￿rms will have to pay. Thus, the
environmental policy is a centrifugal force, i.e. a force that impedes spatial concentration
of economic activity.
Let w be the wage rate, which is the same across sites, and let p be the competitive
price of output.11 A ￿rm located at r chooses labor, machinery and emissions to maximize
its pro￿ts. Thus, the pro￿t per unit of land, ^ Q; at location r; is given by:






c ￿ wL(r) ￿ pK e
￿(r￿r)2
K(r) ￿ ￿(r) E(r) (9)
A ￿rm located at site r treats the production externality z(r) and the concentration
of pollution X(r) as exogenous parameters ze and Xe respectively. Assuming X(r) is
exogenous to the ￿rm implies that the tax ￿(r) is treated by the ￿rms as a ￿xed parameter
11Real wages are constant which means that the marginal product of labor, as de￿ned by the FOC (10a)
is constant across locations. This assumption is also used by Rossi-Hansberg (2005) who investigates
the spatial distribution of economic activity and the associated trade patterns. In Section 3, where we
study the optimal distribution of economic activity, the marginal product of labor di￿ers across sites (see
equation (16a) below).

















c￿1 = ￿(r) (10c)
where ￿(r) =   X(r)￿￿1: Setting ze = z(r), Xe = X(r), the FONC de￿ne a rational
expectations equilibrium spatial distribution of labor, machinery and emissions at each
point r 2 [0;S]: After taking logs on both sides and doing some transformations, which
are described in Appendix A, the FONC result in a system of second kind Fredholm










































"(s)ds + g3(r) = "(r)
where y(r) = lnL(r), x(r) = lnK(r); "(r) = lnE(r) and g1(r); g2(r); g3(r) are some
known functions.
Proposition 1 . Assume that: (i) the kernel k(r;s) de￿ned on [0;2￿] ￿ [0;2￿] is an
L2￿kernel which generates the compact operator W; de￿ned as (W￿)(r) =
R b
a k (r;s)￿(s)ds;
a ￿ s ￿ b; (ii) 1 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ c is not an eigenvalue of W; and (iii) G is a square inte-
grable function, then a unique solution determining the rational expectations equilibrium
distribution of inputs and output exists.
The proof of existence and uniqueness of the REE is presented in the following steps:12






2 drds < 1:
12See Moiseiwitsch (2005) for more detailed de￿nitions.
11The kernels of our model have the following formulation: e￿￿ (r￿s)2 with ￿ = ￿; ￿
(positive numbers) and are de￿ned on [0;2￿] ￿ [0;2￿]:





￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿ (r￿s)2￿ ￿ ￿
2
drds < 1:












e￿ (r￿s)2 takes its highest value when e￿ (r￿s)2 is very small. But the lowest



















drds = 4 ￿2 < 1:
Thus the kernels of our system are L2￿kernels.




k (r;s)￿(s)ds ;a ￿ s ￿ b










So, in our model the upper bound of the norm of the operator generated by the























￿ If k (r;s) is an L2￿ kernel and W is a bounded operator generated by k; then W is
a compact operator.







W Y = G (12)
has a unique solution for all square integrable functions G; if (1 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ c) is not







￿ As we show in Appendix C, the system (11) can be transformed into a second kind
12Fredholm Integral equation of the form (12). Thus a unique REE distribution of
inputs and output exists.￿
To solve the system (11) numerically, for the REE, we use a modi￿ed Taylor-series
expansion method (Maleknejad et al., 2006). More precisely, a Taylor-series expansion
can be made for the solutions y(s) and "(s) in the integrals of the system (11). We use
the ￿rst two terms of the Taylor-series expansion (as an approximation for y(s) and "(s))
and substitute them into the integrals of (11). After some substitutions, we end up with
a linear system of ordinary di￿erential equations of the form:
￿11(r) y(r) + ￿12(r) y
0(r) + ￿13 y
00(r) + ￿11 "(r) + ￿12 "
0(r) + ￿13 "
00(r) = g1(r) (13)
x(r) + ￿21(r) y(r) + ￿22(r) y
0(r) + ￿23 y
00(r) + ￿21 "(r) + ￿22 "
0(r) + ￿23 "
00(r) = g2(r)
￿31(r) y(r) + ￿32(r) y
0(r) + ￿33 y
00(r) + ￿31 "(r) + ￿32 "
0(r) + ￿33 "
00(r) = g3(r)
In order to solve the linear system (13), we need an appropriate number of boundary
conditions. We construct them and then we obtain a linear system of three algebraic
equations that can be solved numerically.
The maximized value of the ￿rm’s pro￿ts ^ Q(r) is also the land-rent per unit of land
that a ￿rm would be willing to pay to operate with these cost and productivity parameters
at location r. Since the decision problem at each location is completely determined by the
technology level z; the wage rate w, the price of machinery pK , the output price p and the
concentration of pollution X; the FONC of the maximization problem give us the REE
values of labor, machinery and emissions used at each location: L = ^ L(z;w;pK;p;X),
K = ^ K(z;w;pK;p;X) and E = ^ E(z;w;pK;p;X): Finally, the equilibrium distribution
of output is given by: q = ^ q(z;w;pK;p;X):
3 The Regulator’s Optimum
After having solved for the REE, we study the optimal solution by assuming the existence
of a regulator who takes all the location decisions. The regulator’s objective is to maximize
13the total value of land in the city, which implies maximization of the pro￿ts net of



























































Comparing the FONC for the optimum to those for the REE, we notice some di￿erences.
First, the FONC (16a) with respect to L(r) contains one extra term - the second term
on the left-hand side. That is, the regulator, when choosing L(r), takes into account the
positive impact of L(r) on the production of all other sites, through knowledge spillovers.
So, increasing labor at r has two e￿ects: it increases output in the standard way, but
it increases the positive externalities at all other sites as well. In the same way, labor
increases at other sites increase the externality in r. This externality is now taken into
account, while the ￿rm, maximizing its own pro￿ts, considered the externality as a ￿xed
parameter.13
The second di￿erence between the optimum and the REE concerns the FONC with
respect to E(r), i.e. equation (16c). The ￿rst term on the left-hand side is the marginal
product of emissions, which is the same as the FONC of the REE. The di￿erence is
in the second term, which shows how changes in the value of emissions at r a￿ect the
13See Appendix B.
14concentration of pollution, not only at r but also at all other sites. This damage, which
is caused by the aggregate pollution in our spatial economy and is altered every time
emissions increase or decrease, is now taken into account by the regulator.
After making some transformations, we end up with the following system of second

































3(r) = "(r) (17c)




known functions. The existence and the uniqueness of the solution can be proved following
the same steps which were presented in Section 2. To determine a numerical solution of
the problem, we follow the same method of Taylor-series expansion used in the REE
case. This approach provides an accurate approximate solution of the integral system as
demonstrated by some numerical examples in Section 5.
4 Optimal Policy Issues
The di￿erences between the REE and the regulator’s optimum give us some intuition
about the design of optimal policies. These di￿erences come from the fact that the
production externality z(r) and the concentration of pollution X(r) are taken as ￿xed
parameters in the case of REE, while the regulator takes them into account. Speci￿cally,
comparing equations (10a) and (10c) with (16a) and (16c) respectively, we observe that
the latter equations have one extra term each. Thus the FONC with respect to L(r) for
the REE equates the marginal product of labor with the given real wage rate MPL =
w
p = ￿ !, while the same condition for the optimum is given by MPL + q z0(L) = ￿ !: The
design of optimal policy in that case is determined by the extra term, q z0(L): So setting
14The analytical solution for the regulator’s optimum is available in the Internet version of the paper.
15v￿(r) = q z0(L) = e￿z(r)L(r)aK(r)bE(r)c￿
@z(r)
@L(r); the real wage rate, at the optimum, is
equal to ￿ ! = v￿(r)+MPL.15 Conceptually, the term v￿(r) takes into account the changes
in the knowledge spillovers across space, when a ￿rm employs more or fewer workers. The
function v￿(r) can also be considered as a subsidy that is given to ￿rms. In that way,
￿rms will have a lower labor cost, ￿ ! ￿ v￿(r), employ more labor, bene￿t from the higher
knowledge spillovers and produce more output.
Probably more interesting is the design of optimal environmental policy. When envi-
ronmental policy is spatially myopic, the pro￿t maximizing ￿rm equates the value of the
marginal product of emissions with the tax imposed on each unit of emissions used in
the production process, p MPE = ￿(r) = ￿ X(r)￿￿1. The optimizing regulator however
equates the value of the marginal product of emissions with the marginal damage of emis-
sions, p MPE = MDE: There is a di￿erence between the MDE = ￿X(r)￿￿1 @X(r)
@E(r) and the
tax function ￿(r) = ￿ X(r)￿￿1 created by the term
@X(r)
@E(r).16 This term shows that when
a ￿rm increases (decreases) the amount of emissions used in the production process, the
concentration of pollution increases (decreases) at all spatial points as well. On the other
hand, in the REE case, each ￿rm decides about the amount of the emissions used as an
input, taking the concentration of pollution across space as given without accounting for
the fact that its own emissions at r a￿ect the aggregate pollution in other areas. Thus,
the designer of optimal environmental policy has to consider the extra damage caused at
all spatial points by the emissions generated at r: As a result, the optimal tax function has
to satisfy ￿￿(r) = MDE = ￿X(r)￿￿1 @X(r)
@E(r) and ￿rms, under optimal environmental policy,
should equate p MPE = ￿￿(r): Thus, in the spatial model, a tax equal to full marginal
damages at the REE, as de￿ned in (5) with ￿ = 1; does not mean full internalization
of the social cost as it is usually understood in environmental economics without spatial
considerations. This is because setting ￿(r) = ￿ X(r)￿￿1 ignores this spatial externality
which is captured by the term
@X(r)
@E(r). We will refer to setting the emission tax at ￿(r) as
the myopic internalization and setting it at ￿￿(r) as the optimal internalization. Finally,
15The term
@z(r)
@L(r) is de￿ned in Appendix B.
16We assume here that taxation at the REE charges the full marginal damage caused by the con-
centration of pollution at a speci￿c site, so ￿ = 1 and   = ￿: The term
@X(r)
@E(r) is de￿ned in Appendix
B.
16imposing the optimal policy rules, v￿(r) and ￿￿(r); the REE can reproduce the optimum.
The enforcement of the optimal taxation, ￿￿(r), implies the implementation of a
di￿erent tax at each spatial point. This could be regarded as a taxation scheme which
might be di￿cult to implement in real conditions. For this reason, based on the optimal
taxation analyzed above, the regulator could enforce zoning taxation. In that case, we
would have areas or zones with a ￿at environmental tax. More speci￿cally, in the areas
with high concentration of economic activity, which su￿er from serious pollution problems,
the environmental tax will be high, but constant. Thus, in the interval [s1;s2] ￿ S; the





The regulator, in order to implement the e￿cient allocation as an equilibrium, uses
the two instruments analyzed above: the subsidy v￿(r) and the environmental tax ￿￿(r):
As far as the subsidy is concerned, the regulator subsidizes labor cost, so as to en-
courage ￿rms to employ more workers in order to internalize knowledge spillovers. The
total amount of money to be spent is equal to
Z S
0
v￿(s) L(s) ds: In a similar way, the
aggregate amount of money the regulator receives from the enforcement of the opti-
mal environmental tax is
Z S
0
￿￿(s) E(s) ds: It’s easy to predict that the tax revenues
and the subsidy expenditures will not equal one another in most cases. However, if at
the optimum a balanced-budget is required, then in cases where the expenditures are
greater than the revenues, or
Z S
0
v￿(s) L(s) ds >
Z S
0
￿￿(s) E(s) ds; the regulator
could impose a lump-sum tax on land owners. Then, the tax per unit of land would be




[v￿(s) L(s) ￿ ￿￿(s) E(s)] ds: In the opposite case, where the rev-
enues exceed the expenditures, or
Z S
0
￿￿(s) E(s) ds >
Z S
0
v￿(s) L(s) ds; the regulator





[￿￿(s) E(s) ￿ v￿(s) L(s)] ds:
17In order to receive this ￿nancial support, the ￿rms could for example be obliged to ￿nance R&D in
pollution control and clean production processes.
175 Numerical Experiments
The objective of this section is to predict where the economic activity will ￿nally be
concentrated under the agglomeration forces of our model. By assigning numerical values
to the parameters, we can predict both the REE and the optimal spatial patterns of
output in our spatial domain, which are implied by the models in Sections 2 and 3. The
spatial distributions of output, labor, machinery and emissions, obtained by using the
Taylor-series expansion approach, will determine the location of ￿rms both at the REE
and the regulator’s optimum and will characterize the optimal spatial policies. Having
in mind that we should exercise caution in interpreting simulations, our intention is to
study how changes in some key parameters describing the agglomeration forces under
study alter the spatial distribution of economic activity.
In our simulations the numerical values for the parameters are set as follows: The
production elasticity of labor, machinery and emissions is set at ￿ = 0:6, b = 0:25; and
c = 0:05; respectively. Thus the implied production elasticity of land is 0:1. The length
of the spatial domain, or our city, is S = 2￿: In the business sector analyzed here, we
consider wages (w = 1) and the price of machinery (pK = 1) as given and the same is
assumed for the price of output which is set at p = 10: We set a reasonable value for ￿;
at 0:01.18 We also assume that there is a port, the natural advantage site, located at the
point ￿ r = ￿. We set ￿ = 1:5 which implies an increasing and convex damage function.
Finally, the ￿ parameter, which shows how much emissions generated at site r a￿ect
the concentration of pollution in nearby areas, is set at 0:5.19 When studying possible
spatial structures, we hold the above parameters constant and vary the agglomeration
parameters which are the \strength" of knowledge spillovers ￿; transportation cost ￿; and
the   which indicates the stringency of the spatially myopic environmental policy. We
also change the location of the natural advantage site (￿ r), to show that our conclusions
18This value of ￿ is low enough to ensure that the \no black hole" assumption, described in Fujita et
al. (1999), holds.
19This value of ￿ was chosen so that the emissions generated at the city centre (￿ r = ￿) have a negligible
e￿ect on the aggregate level of pollution at the two boundary points (r = 0; 2￿). When we study the
e￿ect of taxation on the spatial structure, we will give one more value to ￿ in order to show how, under
the assumption of \more localized" pollution, the environmental policy changes the concentration of
economic activity.
18still hold.
As a benchmark case, we determine the distribution of economic activity under no
agglomeration forces, i.e. ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0;   = 0: This means that there is no
production externality, no transportation cost for machinery and no environmental policy.
In other words, a ￿rm doesn’t bene￿t at all from nearby ￿rms, doesn’t pay anything for
the emissions used in production, and the per unit cost of machinery is the same at all
locations. As expected the spatial distribution of production is uniform over the spatial
domain and ￿rms have no incentives to locate at any spatial point of our economy (￿gure
1).
5.1 Knowledge Spillovers
Figure 2 presents the distribution of economic activity, in terms of the spatial distribution
of output, resulting from ￿ values of 1, 2 and 3; for both low, ￿ = 0:045; and high,
￿ = 0:075; transportation costs.20 The higher ￿ is, the more pro￿table it is for ￿rms
to locate near each other, so as to bene￿t from positive knowledge spillovers. In other
words, the centripetal force of production externality is stronger when ￿ is high, and as
a result, economic activity is more concentrated at certain sites. Environmental policy,
when applied, is assumed to be stringent so that the marginal damage caused by the
concentration of emissions is fully internalized (  = 1:5); but spatially myopic.
Figures 2a and 2b present the REE under the stringent environmental policy. When ￿
and ￿ are low, the distribution of production is approximately uniform. When ￿ increases,
there are two e￿ects: ￿rst, spillovers a￿ect the output more and the production increases
at each site; and second, there are more incentives for agglomerations because bene￿ts
decline faster with distance. But, to produce more output, ￿rms use more emissions
and the concentration of pollution increases at each point. When the concentration of
pollution is very high, the price of emissions is high too. So when ￿rms decide where to
locate, they take into account the centripetal force of strong knowledge spillovers and the
centrifugal force of strict environmental policy. The trade-o￿ between these two opposing
20These ￿ values are consistent with other numerical experiments based on models with similar for-
mulation of knowledge spillovers. For example, see Lucas (2001).
19forces forms the three peaks we observe in case ￿ = 3 (solid line in ￿gures 2a, 2b). This
conclusion holds for low and high transportation cost (￿gures 2a, 2b). The impact of
higher transportation cost is to decrease the concentration of economic activity in areas
near the boundaries. Thus the two peaks near the boundaries are lower when ￿ increases
from 0:045 to 0:075. However, the central peak is higher relative to the boundary ones
as the transportation cost around the city centre is low in every case.
Figures 2c and 2d present the REE without environmental considerations. In this
case, ￿rms do not have to pay a price or a \tax" for the emissions generated during
the production process. The economic activity is now concentrated around the city cen-
tre, because of the two centripetal forces: the transportation cost and the knowledge
spillovers. Stronger knowledge spillovers lead to a higher clustering of economic activity
at the city centre. The use of ￿xed land as a production factor, however, deters economic
activity from concentrating entirely at the city centre.21 The absence of environmental
policy induces the formation of a unique peak and a monocentric city. This is the very
well-known result that has been explained by Krugman (1999) and veri￿ed in the empir-
ical literature: there is always a high concentration of economic activity around natural
advantage sites which is reinforced by the existence of knowledge spillovers.
Figures 2e and 2f show the optimal distribution of economic activity under optimal
environmental policy. As stated above, the regulator takes into account how labor in
one area bene￿ts from labor in nearby areas and how emissions in one area a￿ect the
concentration of pollution in other areas. In this way, the regulator internalizes the
production externality and the damage caused by the use of emissions in the production
process. The result is the formation of two peaks at the points r = ￿
2; 3￿
2 ; from the
origin of the spatial domain [0;S] which is point 0:22 Thus, a bicentric city emerges
21The immobility of land that acts as a centrifugal force is a common argument in new economic
geography models. See, for example, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) who study the internal structure
of a city under di￿erent agglomeration forces.
22Throughout the paper we assume that each site of our spatial domain provides \enough space" to
accommodate the industrial activity implied either by a REE equilibrium or the regulator’s optimum.
If a constraint of the form q(r) ￿ ￿ q; for all r 2 S; is imposed, then at places where the constraint is
binding, peaks will disappear, and it is expected that the overall spatial distribution will be \￿atter",
as some industrial activity will move from sites where there is no space to accommodate it, to adjacent
sites.
20where the natural advantage site is not an agglomeration point. The explanation is the
following: at the optimum with environmental considerations, the regulator realizes the
positive interaction of ￿rms located at nearby areas, but he also takes into account the
fact that if all ￿rms locate around \one" spatial point, then the cost of environmental
policy will be very high. So the optimal solution is to cluster around \two points"
and form a bicentric city. We should also notice that the higher transportation cost
(beta=0:075) leads, as expected, to a lower concentration of economic activity around
the two peaks.23 When there is no environmental policy, but knowledge spillovers are
internalized by the regulator (￿gures 2g and 2h), a unique cluster emerges around the
natural advantage site. The comparison between ￿gures 2e-2f and 2g-2h makes clear that
it is the optimal environmental policy that induces a bicentric city. Comparing the REE
and the optimum, when there are no environmental considerations, we notice that in the
optimum, the internalization of the production externality leads to a higher concentration
of economic activity at each spatial point.24
Summarizing, our results show that the optimal environmental policy impedes the
clustering of economic activity around one spatial point, which would occur in its absence.
But, what is probably more important is that at the optimum, there is no concentration
around the natural advantage site when knowledge spillovers and environmental policy
interact. In other words, while both the absence of environmental policy and a spatially
myopic policy lead to the predicted result, according to which a lot of industries locate
around the site with the natural advantage, the implementation of the optimal environ-
mental policy breaks down this pattern. This is because when the full cost of emissions
is internalized across space, then clustering around the site with the natural advantage
generates high social costs which make the cost advantage of this site disappear. The
balancing between the centripetal forces (knowledge spillovers and transportation costs)
and the centrifugal force (optimal environmental policy) creates cost advantages at two
23At the optimum (￿gures 2e and 2f), the solid line corresponds to ￿ = 3: The two peaks of that line
do not appear in the ￿gure, because we wanted to draw all three curves in one ￿gure, so as to point out
the di￿erences. So at the spatial points r = ￿
2; 3￿
2 ; where we have the two peaks, the corresponding
distribution value for ￿ = 0:045 is 1:5 ￿ 107 ; and for ￿ = 0:075 is 1 ￿ 107:
24This conclusion is in line with Rossi-Hansberg’s (2004) results about the di￿erences between optimal
and equilibrium distributions.
21other sites. Thus, a bicentric city emerges, since economic activity is attracted by the
new cost advantage sites. It should be noted that we cannot have a single \new cost
advantage site" because then, as in the case of the port, the intense accumulation of pro-
duction around this point would make environmental cost increase and the cost advantage
disappear.
5.2 Transportation Cost
To study how changes in the transportation cost a￿ect the spatial structure of our city,
we use the values ￿ = (0:045;0:06;0:075) for weak (￿ = 1) and strong (￿ = 3) knowledge
spillovers. The high value of ￿ (0.075) was selected to double the per unit price of
machinery at the boundaries (r = 0; S) and the low value of ￿ (0.045) to increase the per
unit price of machinery by 50% at the same points. Environmental policy when applied
is spatially myopic and stringent (  = 1:5):
The results are presented in ￿gure 3. In ￿gure 3a we observe the clustering of economic
activity around the city centre at the REE which is the result of the low value of ￿. Higher
transportation costs (solid line) imply lower densities at the boundaries and at all other
points, except for ￿ r = ￿. For ￿ = 3, low transportation costs (dashed line in ￿gure 3b)
induce three peaks, but the main cluster remains at the natural advantage site. However,
higher values of ￿ lead to a lower concentration around the two boundary peaks, as it is
more expensive now to transport a lot of machinery to spatial points far from the city
centre.
When environmental policy is optimal (￿gures 3e and 3f) we observe again the for-
mation of the two clusters and a bicentric city. The intuition behind this result is similar
to the one presented in the previous section. Higher values of ￿ imply lower densities
of output around the two peaks. Absence of environmental policy at the REE (￿gures
3c and 3d) or lack of environmental considerations at the regulator’s optimum (￿gures
3g and 3h) induce a monocentric city. In general, as expected, increases in ￿ decrease
economic activity across space.
225.3 Changes in the Location of the Natural Advantage Site
The results of the numerical experiments presented above suggest that in the REE, the
￿rst nature advantage site will always act as an attractor of economic activity and will
lead to the formation of either a monocentric or a polycentric city with the main cluster
around that natural advantage site. However, this is not the case for the optimum where
the agglomeration forces studied here induce the formation of a bicentric city where
neither of the two peaks is located at the spatial point with the inherent advantage.
In this subsection, we show that the above results hold even in the case where we
place the natural cost advantage location in di￿erent sites of our spatial domain. Figure
4 presents the REE (￿gures 4a, 4b) and the optimal distribution of economic activity
(￿gures 4c, 4d) when the port is available at two di￿erent sites (￿ r = ￿
4 or ￿ r = 3￿
4 ). At
the REE, the higher concentration of economic activity is again observed around the site
with the natural advantage. At the optimum, however, the bicentric city still emerges,
but now the two peaks are not symmetric. There is a higher concentration of economic
activity in sites which are closer to the ￿rst nature advantage site. It should be noted
that the two peaks remain at the points ￿
2 and 3￿
2 from the origin, which means that
the location of the peaks is not a￿ected by the location of the port. What is a￿ected,
however, is the size of the peaks, as the cluster which is closer to the port is larger.
Figures 4c and 4d show that when the port is available at ￿ r = ￿
4 or ￿ r = 3￿
4 ; the left peak
is higher compared to the right one, as expected, since the transportation cost from the
port to the spatial point 3￿
2 (where the second peak is observed) is higher relative to the
transportation cost to the ￿rst peak at ￿
2:
5.4 Environmental Policy
In analyzing the impact from changes in environmental policy, we do not consider optimal
emission taxes as de￿ned in Section 4, but only spatially myopic emission taxes at the
REE as de￿ned by (5).25 As already stated, this tax depends on the concentration of
pollution at each spatial point and the tax rate is a function of the marginal damage
25The imposition of optimal taxes would reproduce the optimum (￿gures 2 and 3).
23caused in the economy by the aggregate level of pollution at a given point. Depending
on the stringency of environmental policy, this form of taxation could fully or partly
internalize the marginal damage. The strict or the lax environmental policy determines
the amount of money ￿rms are obliged to pay for the emissions they generate. The  
parameter shows the degree of internalization and the stringency of environmental policy.
  = 1:5 means full internalization and every value of   which is 0 <   < 1:5 implies
lower taxation and a weaker centrifugal force as   declines towards zero.
In Figure 5, we present the spatial distribution of economic activity using di￿erent
values of  : Figure 5a is drawn for ￿ = 0:5 and 5b for ￿ = 2: The higher value of ￿ means
that pollution is more localized and a￿ects only nearby areas compared to the lower one.
Let’s explain ￿rst why ￿ = 0:5 leads to the clustering of economic activity in three peaks,
while ￿ = 2 forms a unique peak. Under low values of ￿; emissions at each site pollute
other sites that are far away. But, if each site is a￿ected by emissions generated at a lot
of sites, farther or nearer, the concentration of pollution will be higher at each spatial
point. In that case, ￿rms avoid locating all at the same spatial point, so as not to increase
further the \price" of emissions. For this reason, we have the clustering of production in
three peaks. When pollution is more localized (￿ = 2) emissions generated at one site do
not a￿ect other sites a lot and so the \price" of emissions is lower. Then, ￿rms have a
stronger incentive to locate near each other in order to bene￿t from knowledge spillovers.
This is the case presented in ￿gure 5b. It should be noted that both in the case of a
single cluster and of three clusters, the main cluster emerges at the site with the natural
advantage.
As far as the stringency of environmental policy is concerned, the results could be
easily predicted. Strict environmental policy and full internalization of marginal damage
(dotted lines in ￿gure 5) lead to a lower distribution of production in every case. On
the other hand, more lenient environmental regulations (solid lines in ￿gure 5) not only
lead to higher production at each site but also promote the agglomeration of economic
activity around the city centre. So the intuition is simple: environmental policy deters
24the clustering of production and makes the distribution of economic activity ￿atter.26
In other words, strict environmental policy makes the distribution of economic activity
less uneven. This result is consistent with the empirical literature, according to which
environmental regulations restrict economic activity and result in a spreading out or an
exiting of polluting ￿rms.27
6 Conclusions
We develop a model of a single city - of length S - in which ￿rms are free to choose
where to locate. The city has a nonuniform internal structure because of externalities in
production, the existence of a location with natural cost advantage and the assumption
of pollution di￿using in space which implies the implementation of environmental policy.
The ￿rst two forces have been identi￿ed in the theoretical and empirical literature as
two of the most important forces that work to encourage the concentration of economic
activity around the natural advantage site. Thus, our intention was to study whether
the consideration of environmental issues can change the very well-known \monocentric
city" result.
Our results suggest that under an optimal (non-spatially myopic) environmental pol-
icy, the monocentric city collapses to a bicentric city. The two clusters formed in that case
result from the full internalization of environmental damages and knowledge spillovers.
On the other hand, the REE under a spatially myopic environmental policy results either
in a monocentric or in a polycentric city. What is also signi￿cant is that in both REE
cases, the port attracts a large number of ￿rms and the major cluster of economic activity
emerges at this site. However, and in contrast to the equilibrium case, in the optimum,
neither of the two clusters occurs at the natural advantage site which repels agglomer-
ation because, as explained in the text, it loses its cost advantage when environmental
damages are taken into account.
Notice that the above results hold even if we choose a spatial point di￿erent from
26The proof of ￿atness is presented in Appendix D.
27See Introduction: Greenstone (2002), Henderson (1996).
25the city centre for the location of the natural advantage site. Then, at the REE, ￿rms
\follow" the port and as a result, there is still a high concentration of economic activity
around this spatial point. Furthermore, the optimal environmental policy induces again
a bicentric city, but now the two peaks are not symmetric: the peak which is closer to the
port is always higher. Finally, when we assume that no environmental policy is enforced
for the emissions generated in the production process, then the spatial patterns derived
are the same in both cases of the REE and the optimum: a monocentric city emerges
and economic activity is concentrated around a unique site, which is always the spatial
point with the natural advantage.
A potential policy implication of our results suggests that when a natural advantage
site is associated with spatial knowledge spillovers, and with emissions of pollutants which
di￿use in space and need to be regulated, then the optimal spatial design seems to be a
bicentric structure with two clusters which do not coincide with the natural advantage
site. In general, sites with inherent advantages can lose their comparative advantage
when social costs at these spatial points become higher and higher. Then, other sites
appear to be more attractive as they provide stronger cost advantages compared to the
natural ones.
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We transform the system in order to obtain a system of second kind Fredholm integral
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"(s)ds + g3(r) = "(r) (A3)
where:
g1(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cf(1 ￿ b ￿ c) [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
b [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + c [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
g2(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cfa [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
(1 ￿ a ￿ c) [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + c [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
g3(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cfa [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
b [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + (1 ￿ a ￿ b) [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
Taylor-series expansions can be made for the solutions y(s) and "(s) :
y(s) = y(r) + y
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If the integrals in equations (A7)-(A9) can be solved analytically, then the bracketed
quantities are functions of r alone. So (A7)-(A9) become a linear system of ordinary
di￿erential equations that can be solved, if we use an appropriate number of boundary
conditions.
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3(r): Substituting them into (A7), (A8) & (A9), we have a linear
system of three algebraic equations that can be solved using Mathematica.
Appendix B: The same method of modi￿ed Taylor-series expansion was used in
order to solve for the regulator’s optimum. The FONC for the optimum, (16a), (16c),
contain two terms that need to be determined:
#z(r)
















e￿￿(s￿r)2ds: Using these two terms, we follow the
method analysed in Appendix A to ￿nd the optimal solution.
33Appendix C: Transformation of the system (11) to a single Fredholm equation of
second kind (Polyanin and Manzhirov, 1998).
We de￿ne the functions Y (r) and G(r) on [0;3S], where Y (r) = yi(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S)
and G(r) = gi(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S) for (i ￿ 1)S ￿ r ￿ iS:28 Next, we de￿ne the kernel C(r;s)
on the square [0;3S] ￿ [0;3S] as follows: C(r;s) = kij(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S; s ￿ (j ￿ 1)S) for
(i ￿ 1)S ￿ r ￿ iS and (j ￿ 1)S ￿ s ￿ jS:
So the system (11) can be rewritten as the single Fredholm equation:
Y (r) ￿ 1
1￿a￿b￿c
R 3S
0 C(r;s) Y (s) ds = G(r), where 0 ￿ r ￿ 3S:
If the kernels kij(r;s) are square integrable on the square [0;S] ￿ [0;S] and gi(r) are
square integrable functions on [0;S], then the kernel C(r;s) is square integrable on the
new square: [0;3S] ￿ [0;3S] and G(r) is square integrable on [0;3S]:
Appendix D: Figure 5: Proof of ￿atness.
In order to measure ￿atness, we use the concept of curvature. Curvature is the
amount by which a geometric object deviates from being ￿at, or straight in the case of




￿ ￿ ￿; where
q(r) = exp(￿z(r))L(r)aK(r)bE(r)c is the production function. We use Mathematica to
measure the curvature of lines in ￿gure 5. In ￿gure 5a, at the point r = ￿, the dotted
line has ￿(￿) = 168;174, the dashed line has ￿(￿) = 190;340 and the solid line has
￿(￿) = 248;240: In ￿gure 5b, at the point r = ￿, the dotted line has ￿(￿) = 360;077,
the dashed line has ￿(￿) = 425;289 and the solid line has ￿(￿) = 608;352: The ￿attest
curve is the one with the lowest curvature value, i.e. the dotted line (in both cases).
Another way to measure the curvature at a speci￿c point is to use the approach of
the osculating circle. According to this approach, from any point of any curve, where
the curvature is non-zero, there is a unique circle which most closely approximates the
curve near that point. This is the osculating circle at that point. The radius (R) of the
osculating circle determines the curvature at that point in the following way: ￿ = 1
R:
So we draw the osculating circles at point r = ￿, of the curves in ￿gure 5:
28We assume that y1 = y, y2 = x and y3 = "; so as to follow the notation of our model.
34(a) (b)
Figure 5(a): Let R11 be the radius of the osculating circle of the solid line, R12
be the radius of the osculating circle of the dashed line and R13 be the radius of the
osculating circle of the dotted line, then it is obvious that R11 < R12 < R13. Also, if the
corresponding curvatures are ￿11 = 1
R11, ￿12 = 1
R12 and ￿13 = 1
R13, then ￿11 > ￿12 > ￿13: As
a result, the dotted line is the ￿attest curve. In a similar way, we prove that the dotted
curve of ￿gure 5(b) is the ￿attest one.
Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark case: The Distribution of Economic Activity under no Agglomera-
tion Forces
35(a) REE (beta=0:045) (b) REE (beta=0:075)
(c) REE without Environmental
Considerations (beta=0:045)
(d) REE without Environmental
Considerations (beta=0:075)







Figure 2: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of delta. Dotted
Line: delta=1, Dashed Line: delta=2, Solid Line: delta=3
36(a) REE (delta=1) (b) REE (delta=3)
(c) REE without Environmental
Considerations (delta=1)
(d) REE without Environmental
Considerations (delta=3)







Figure 3: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of transportation
cost. Dotted Line: beta=0.045, Dashed Line: beta=0.06, Solid Line: beta=0.075 37(a) REE (￿ r = ￿
4) (b) REE (￿ r = 3￿
4 )
(c) Optimum (￿ r = ￿
4) (d) Optimum (￿ r = 3￿
4 )
Figure 4: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the Location (rbar) of the
Port (beta=0.06, delta=2)
(a) ￿ = 0:5 (b) ￿ = 2
Figure 5: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of psi. Dotted
Line: psi=1.5, Dashed Line: psi=0.9, Solid Line: psi=0.3.
38